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TRANSCRIPTS
 
GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE FBI, JAMES BAKER,
 
IN CONVERSATION WITH PROFESSOR MARY
 




Mary DeRosa (MD): Thank you, and I want to thank Jim Baker very 
much for coming here. We have worked together and known each 
other for many years. He is a remarkable lawyer and public servant, and 
we are really, very lucky to hear from you today. What we thought we’d 
do is go into depth on some particular issues that the FBI is engaged in 
internationally, and I’ll ask Jim some questions, and at the end, we’re 
going to leave a little time to open it up for questions, so you can think 
about your questions, but if the question you are thinking about has 
something to do with Hillary Clinton’s emails, or investigations into 
Russian activities in the election, then probably you ought to think 
about another question, because, for obvious reasons, Jim is not going 
to be able to talk about those issues. But there is a lot he can talk about. 
I thought maybe we could start with just a little background. People 
are very familiar I think with what the FBI does domestically and its 
presence and role domestically, maybe less so with the FBI’s overseas 
responsibilities and footprint, so maybe you can give us some of that 
background to start off. 
James Baker (JB): Sure. Mary, it’s great to see you again and thank 
you for this opportunity, Shannon, and the whole Journal, thank you 
for this opportunity. The FBI is mainly focused on the United States, 
protecting the United States from a range of threats both domestic and 
foreign, and on also enforcing the criminal law of the United States. 
And so, in order to do that, we inevitably have to be international in 
scope as well. So, to think about it correctly, there are two buckets I 
would put our work in. One is, our operational folks that people might 
be familiar with—counterterrorism in particular, but criminal, counterin­
telligence, the whole nine yards, really everything that we do—is inevitably 
to some degree international in its scope because of the way that the 
perpetrators operate, the threats, and the threat vectors. Hopefully we’ll 
also talk about cyber security in detail. So that’s the operational way we 
deal with the international world and I can dive into that in a second. 
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Then we also have a dedicated cadre of folks who focus almost 
exclusively on international operations. It’s called the international 
operations division, helpfully. We have about 400 people and about 300 
of them are overseas. About 100 or so, 150 or so are located at 
headquarters or in the United States. So the folks overseas are referred 
to as legal attaches, and they are at Embassies. We have, I think, 
sixty-three legal attache´ ofﬁces around the world and another twenty-
ﬁve or so sub-ofﬁces in different locations. They have responsibility for 
covering, in one way or another, about 200 countries. We have folks all 
over the world dealing with international interactions. 
What they do is coordinate and consult with our international 
partners—with U.S. government folks at Embassies ﬁrst, and then also 
with our international partners. They’re trying to assist in joint investi­
gations that we might be running with the foreign partner and with 
coordinating evidence requests back and forth. We might need evi­
dence from a foreign country and they might need evidence from the 
United States, so we work on that. 
A substantial part of what they do is training. They are over there 
training folks in what we do and how we do it. Folks are very interested 
in how the FBI goes about its investigations. 
MD: So foreign law enforcement? 
JB: We are training foreign law enforcement. Sometimes they’re very 
interested in U.S. law, and we’ll train on that. But they’re also inter­
ested in FBI techniques: investigative techniques; investigative method­
ology; how we go about conducting oversight; management oversight 
of our activities; how we deal with technology issues and things like 
that. We do substantial training in-country, if you will. We also then 
have, at the FBI academy down at Quantico, something we call the 
“National Academy.” It’s a rather lengthy course where folks from 
around the United States, state and local law enforcement, as well as 
from foreign countries, come to Quantico and spend signiﬁcant time at 
the FBI, at the Academy, going through a range of courses covering 
how we go about our business, how U.S. law enforcement works, how 
U.S. legal structures work, and so on. This is highly sought after by state 
and local authorities, as well as our foreign partners. This is a big deal 
and it is crucial in terms of building the relationships overseas that then 
help us do our jobs. As you can imagine, really in any line of work, 
having effective business relationships is critically important to being 
successful over the long term. So that’s what they focus on. 
We operate in an international environment on very case-speciﬁc 
things: pursuing the bad guys overseas, trying to get evidence, coordi­
nating to make sure that something bad doesn’t happen overseas, 
896 [Vol. 48 
THE FBI AND INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE
 
protecting our allies from a threat or protecting a U.S. facility overseas 
from a threat. Then we’ve also got this longer term deep international 
presence. Just for the law students in the room, in terms of dealing 
with, and thinking about, the international environment you end up 
focusing on public international law—customary international law, 
treaties, these kinds of things—and thinking about the legal structure 
in that way. But that is a somewhat narrow, in terms of the number of 
person hours spent on that by lawyers and people around the world, 
small subset of what happens internationally, so to speak. All this other 
stuff is happening at the FBI and at other government agencies. For 
those of you who are interested in this kind of thing from a career 
perspective, you should think more broadly about international law. 
The State Department is great and the Legal Advisor’s Ofﬁce at the 
State Department is great, but that’s not the only game in town, in 
terms of thinking about working in international matters. There are a 
lot of opportunities beyond the State Department. 
MD: So, in the U.S. Government, you can think more broadly. For 
example, the Justice Department also has a lot of presence outside the 
country. 
With that background, you have over your career, spent a lot of time 
working on cyber issues and it has been a major and increasing focus of 
the FBI over the last ﬁfteen or twenty years. Now it is a very signiﬁcant 
focus and it is, by its nature, very international. Maybe you can talk 
more about this. Many of the perpetrators of cybercrime in the United 
States are located overseas, but even if they’re located here, the nature 
of the internet means that investigations would likely be international. 
Maybe you could talk about the way the FBI handles cyber investiga­
tions: what are the challenges? And in what way does the unusually 
international quality of cybercrime maybe complicate or challenge the 
investigations of those issues. You can start wherever you want, but I 
think the beginning, the number one issue, in an investigation is who 
did it, and even that in the cyber area is very complicated. Maybe you 
can start there and talk about that aspect of cyber investigation. 
JB: Sure. I’ll just start, and then pull me back and guide me in a 
different direction if I go off on some tangent. There is no doubt that 
cyber is international. And any person working in that area, regardless 
of where you are—at the FBI, another part of the government or in the 
private sector—if you’re not thinking about it in terms of its interna­
tional aspects, you really don’t understand it, you don’t get it, and 
you’re not going to be able to deal with it. That’s the main thing. 
Cyber is international and international is cyber. And I’m kind of 
ﬂipping those around in the sense that in cyber people think about it 
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perhaps too narrowly in the sense of intrusions and intrusion protec­
tions and so on, but it makes sense if you really think more broadly 
about the role of technology today in society, and how we cannot 
operate really without engaging with technology in a signiﬁcant way. 
And so I think it’s important to understand that fact. It’s important to 
understand it both in terms of the threat, then what the threat actors 
are thinking about, and how they’re thinking about us, the potential 
victims. I read something recently that I thought was quite interesting 
that—I can’t remember who said this, so I apologize to the source of 
it—the most useful human tool today is the smartphone. It’s not a 
hammer or chisel or anything else that we can think of. It’s a smart 
phone because that’s what so many people have and they use it to such 
a signiﬁcant degree. Well that presents all kinds of risks, and a lot of 
those risks are posed by international folks. 
But in terms of dealing with this “whodunit” kind of thing, I would 
say we have to approach how we go about our investigation with an 
open mind. In the cyber environment, it is not a simple question to 
answer. Sometimes it’s easy but many times it’s not. 
One of the particular problems that I’m trying to focus on is the 
attribution question—that is and has been a key problem and we can 
spend a lot of time talking about here today in the cyber area. And I 
guess I would say that attribution—it’s an art. It’s an art as much as a 
science. And it requires analysis and data and facts. And that you have 
to understand the technology in order to be able to understand the 
facts correctly. The facts can lead you to an identiﬁcation, but you have 
to think deeply about those facts and understand them, and that 
requires a careful analysis, so we really try to do that effectively. I would 
say that we as a government, a federal government, are getting better, 
increasingly, about attribution, and using the tools available to us. The 
issue is that the adversaries are also getting better about obscuring the 
nature and scope of their activities and their location. So, I don’t know 
if that’s a chicken and egg problem, or if that’s a cat and mouse 
problem, or just an escalating problem, but, those two things are 
happening simultaneously, so that presents challenging issues. 
MD: So, maybe just, back up a little and talk a little about why 
attribution is so much more difﬁcult. And when you say the FBI or the 
government is getting better, is it getting better technically at tracing 
back, or are there other aspects to understanding and improving 
attribution? 
JB: I would say we’re increasingly better technologically. We are 
increasingly better with our analysis of the technology and what it 
means. You have to really be knowledgeable about these networks: 
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understand what is happening, what a particular piece of data means in 
terms of how a network has routed material, and the forensic footprint 
of the data. That does require specialization, and we have more people 
who are better at it, therefore we’re getting better at it. That’s one way 
to think about it. 
It is both technology and analytical rigor and skill that enables you to 
better ﬁgure out what’s happening. And as I say, at the same time the 
bad guys know this is a problem, they know this is hard for us, and they 
want to make it even harder. They are doing whatever they can, 
especially focusing on obscuring the metadata or the data about data 
(the bread crumbs if you will) that are associated with their communi­
cations. They are trying like heck to obscure that, even to a greater 
degree, than exists inherently within the networks. Inherently, there 
are challenges with respect to attribution because of how communica­
tions are routed for lawful reasons by legitimate companies, and then if 
you layer on top of that some of the techniques that adversaries use, it’s 
even harder. Then you layer on top of that encryption, and we have a 
whole other ball of wax. We’ll come back to that. 
MD: We deﬁnitely want to get to encryption. I read something very 
recently about a number of cyber criminals, cyber actors who are now 
pretending to be Russian because there is so much attention paid to 
Russian hackers. You’re seeing a lot of—and people have been able to 
identify—Russian code that looks like it has gone through a translation 
app, so maybe that’s an example—when you say they are trying to mask, 
hide and trying to misdirect. There are very creative criminals. 
JB: It’s extremely creative. So, it depends on their purpose, where 
they are, what they’re trying to do, and how they’re trying to fake us 
out. Sometimes they’ll pretend to be from particular foreign countries 
and do things—without getting into too much detail—to make them­
selves look like they’re coming from that particular location in a deeper 
way than just an IP address that happens to show up from a foreign 
country. They try to really look like they are coming from that location. 
But then also, we have the problem of foreign actors trying to look like 
they are coming from the United States, for a variety of reasons. One 
reason is because we have good infrastructure here, and they want to 
piggy back off of that. But secondly, they know a lot about U.S. laws and 
they know what restrictions are going to apply inside the United States. 
They want to take advantage of that to slow us down. Even if at the end 
of the day if we ultimately ﬁgure out where they were at the time of 
their intrusion activities, they might be gone by that point, so if they can 
just slow us down, knowing that eventually we might catch up to where 
they were, they think they’ll be gone from there by a certain point. It’s 
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both things—they sometimes want to look like they’re overseas, they 
sometimes want to look like they’re here. 
MD: Interesting. When we talk about different cybercrimes or differ­
ent aspects of cybercrime, what are the different kinds of international 
actors engaging in the same sort of techniques maybe, but for different 
purposes. Can you talk a little about who those actors are, and maybe 
what some of the differences are? Does who it is make a difference in 
how you have to deal with them? 
JB: Sure. So it’s nation-states that are highly technically advanced in 
many instances. They are very well-resourced both from a technological 
perspective as well as from a human resource perspective. They have 
lots of people they can throw at a problem. I can come back to that in a 
second. Transnational criminal organizations are mostly interested in 
money. The nation-states are interested in a range of different things, 
in particular they are interested in information, both about U.S. 
government ofﬁcials and U.S. government classiﬁed information. The 
type of thing that you would think of as more classical espionage. But 
then they are stealing personally identiﬁable information about Ameri­
cans and stealing it with a long-term perspective in mind as they 
monitor who we are, what we do, and where we move. They plot out 
where they are going to take advantage of that information. And they 
also steal economic data that is beneﬁcial to them and their companies. 
In addition to then embedding themselves in a persistent way in our 
networks to continue their espionage activities. They are then poten­
tially positioning themselves to actually take something more character­
istic of a cyber-attack in the future, should that be necessary. They are 
very well resourced and robust in terms of the threat that they pose. 
Aside from focusing on money, transnational criminal organizations 
after money are also, in many instances, highly sophisticated, danger­
ous, and they might cause wreckage inadvertently. So, that’s a potential 
problem. Terrorist organizations are also a threat, both in the physical 
world as well as in the cyber world. Then you have different types of 
criminals, in smaller groups, that you might consider organized crime 
but not on the scale that I was talking about a second ago. Individual 
hackers that are after something. And then you have other types of 
organizations that aren’t interested in damage, destruction, or in 
stealing money, but for whatever reason, they want to disrupt the 
operation of a network or a website, or take command of some type of 
thing. So they potentially pose threats as well. 
Did I answer your question? 
MD: You did, yes. I don’t know what’s gotten the most attention, but 
there has certainly been a lot of attention on state actor hacks and 
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“attacks” in a non-legal sense. I’m thinking, for example, of North 
Korea and the Sony incident, Iran and the U.S. ﬁnancial sector. With 
Sony, Iran, and China’s economic espionage, the FBI and the U.S. 
government have gone public with their attribution assessments. Maybe 
you can talk about the process there and some of the challenges that 
present when you are actually dealing with an investigation of a state 
actor. 
JB: Because of the FBI’s role as a national security entity, with both 
national security authorities as well as law enforcement authorities, we 
can look at a problem from a 360-degree perspective and try to ﬁgure 
out the right, or best, way to thwart or disrupt the activities of the 
nefarious actor, as well as bring them to justice. We know that it’s not 
always the case that you’re going to have something wrapped up in a 
nice prosecution: you bring somebody to the United States, you put 
them in a federal court, you try them, convict them, and send them to 
jail. 
That happens, but it doesn’t always happen, and we’ve gotten our 
minds around that, especially over the last sixteen years with respect to 
terrorism cases. We know that there are going to be other outcomes 
aside from just arresting somebody and putting them in jail here in the 
United States. I think we try to look at these threats from that 360­
degree perspective. If the nefarious actor is a nation state, you’re not 
going to put a nation state in jail. You can put individual actors in jail if 
you can ﬁgure out who those are, and I’ll come back to that if I can. The 
question is: how do you disrupt these activities and how do you deter 
future activities like that? One way is to go public with attribution. With 
respect to that process, at a high level, we want to make sure we were 
right. We want to make sure that we’ve done rigorous analysis of the 
facts, that we’re highly conﬁdent in the attribution that we are going to 
make publically. That’s number one. 
Number two is that we want to make sure that we have coordinated or 
de-conﬂicted with other entities in the U.S. government and perhaps 
with our foreign partners to make sure that they don’t have some 
interest that would be damaged by making this information public. You 
do increase the risk of public disclosures about how you determined 
that it was country X, and we have to be prepared to deal with that. 
You’re going to get a million FOIA requests for this kind of informa­
tion, so you want to make sure that you’ve thought through all the risks 
and beneﬁts of the attribution. But then, that may be the way to go 
about doing it. The attribution problem is—and I’m not an interna­
tional lawyer by training or by trade currently—one of the things that 
inhibits the development of international legal norms with respect to 
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cyber activities. It’s this idea that countries have that they can basically 
get away with it, and they don’t have to conform to the norm because 
they can sneak around it. The norm doesn’t get developed and doesn’t 
have the effect that legal norms that have developed over the years have 
internationally because you can see that it’s a state actor driving a ship 
through a particular location. 
MD: I’m not aware of the U.S. government having actually identiﬁed 
a state actor as a cyber actor up until a few years ago, and recently there 
have been quite a few. Is that a movement on the part of the Govern­
ment, the FBI, and others, to recognize that the other way wasn’t 
working and we need to be more public about it? 
JB: I guess I would say I think we’ve gained more experience dealing 
with the problem, and the limitations on the tools that are available to 
us to thwart the activities, and so, again, it’s sort of a risk-beneﬁt analysis 
to try to deal with these countries and not let them get away with it. 
To try to hold them accountable, knowing that there is a certain 
amount of risk involved. Then also knowing that there are risks 
involved in not doing something to protect our people, our facilities, 
our information. 
I think we’re gaining more experience and willing to try different 
things. If we think we can indict a foreign government ofﬁcial because 
we have the evidence, and we think that would make sense, then we’ll 
do that. If we think attribution is the thing to do, we’ll do that. If it turns 
out that there’s some equity out there that the intelligence community 
has, for example, that militates against making an attribution public, 
then we’ll hold off. I think we’re evolving our thinking about the range 
of options available to us and trying to be very thoughtful, but also 
aggressive when dealing with what is a very aggressive threat coming at 
us. 
MD: Just to wrap up on the cyber issue and lead us into the 
encryption issue: the investigation of cybercrime and cyber activities 
very much involves the private sector, and the private sector is, for the 
most part, the victim of a lot of these cyber activities. How do you see 
the FBI interacting with the private sector, and what are some of the 
challenges there? How do you work with the private sector to try to 
make sure that it’s an effective relationship? 
JB: We think of companies that have been victimized as victims, and 
we approach them on that basis. The FBI is very used to dealing with 
victims of a whole range of terrible crimes. We have a lot of tools that we 
can bring to bear to try to deal with what may be a persistent ongoing 
threat, or to help them understand what happened and to ultimately 
bring the people who are responsible for this to justice, if possible, or at 
902 [Vol. 48 
THE FBI AND INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE
 
least call them out or deter them from further activities. Companies are 
often weary of dealing with us in the cyber realm, there is no doubt 
about that. I understand that, having been in the private sector a 
couple of different times, I get that. You lose a certain amount of 
control when you start to bring the federal government into it. 
I think, however, that we’ve been effective in developing ways to 
protect their data. If we have to do some examination of some part of 
their data or their network in connection with the investigation a) we 
care a lot about getting it right and b) I think we’ve come up with ways 
to actually be effective in protecting the data from exposure either in 
court, in a proceeding, through FOIA, or through criminal discovery. 
Obviously if you end up with a defendant, the defendant’s rights have 
to be protected as well. Trying to ﬁgure out that balance is critically 
important to us. But we care a lot about it and we care a lot about 
getting it right. 
I guess, to ﬂip it around a little bit, I think companies also are 
sometimes hesitant to come to us and expose that they have been 
victimized. They don’t want that to become public for a lot of different 
reasons. Perhaps for reputational reasons, or because competitors who 
might take advantage of them. What I would add though is in that there 
are many great companies out there who offer cyber security services to 
protect them and to do forensic evaluations, and so on. It’s important 
to remember that in many instances a company is dealing with a 
nation-state on the other side that is trying to victimize them. That, as I 
said before, is well-resourced, highly technically advanced and persis­
tent, and can be there for the long term. 
The question is: are you, as a corporation, able to fend off a 
nation-state? Is that really what you’re capable of doing? Even though 
you might hire some great companies collectively, are you really able to 
do that without assistance in some way from the federal government, from 
the FBI, from DHS, etc.? I would urge people to think carefully about 
that and to not be overconﬁdent, frankly, in their ability to do that. 
And as an aside, if you are a corporate leader and you are not focused 
on cyber, you are missing the boat. It is critically important in a whole 
range of ways to your effective operation as a company, and perhaps 
your existence as a company. Not only are people stealing things like 
intellectual property, and have been for a long time, we increasingly see 
the ransomware threat, where these malicious actors will ﬁnd some way 
to tie up your networks, tie up your data so you can’t access or use it and 
you have to pay them a ransom in order to free it up. Even if you pay it, 
how conﬁdent are you that they’re not still there doing whatever they 
want to do. 
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MD: It’s hard to imagine, given everything that’s been out there in 
the last ﬁve or so years, that there are corporate leaders that aren’t 
focusing on cyber. Is that something you still see? Has that improved or 
do you still think there’s a challenge there? 
JB: I think there’s a challenge there. I think it has improved but I still 
think there is a challenge there. People, such as executives, are too 
willing to delegate to cybersecurity folks without themselves spending 
enough time developing a sufﬁcient level of understanding of what’s 
happening to execute their ﬁduciary responsibilities to the company. I 
think that’s an issue. I think people need to focus on that. 
Also, just for lawyers, my two-cents to the law students in the audience 
is sort of similar: I don’t really care what part of the law you are 
interested in, if you are not focused on understanding technology and 
cyber to a degree of proﬁciency, you are going to be left behind. You 
are not going to be an effective lawyer in today’s environment and you 
are going to increasingly be left behind in your legal career because it 
infuses so many different parts of the world. You continually bump into 
it from a legal perspective, whether you are in the government or 
whether you’re in the private sector. You need to understand tech to a 
signiﬁcant degree. 
MD: I teach a cyber class here and I always have a similar message 
because I think you are absolutely right. I have deﬁnitely seen in my 
time and practice that there is a tendency with cyber issues or other 
technology related issues, for senior people to say “oh, that’s tech, I 
don’t get that,” “that’s cyber, I don’t get that,” and turn it over to 
experts. And these are lawyers and policymakers, and therefore the law 
and the policy hasn’t developed in as healthy a way as it otherwise 
could. What I say to my students is, don’t be scared by the technology. 
There is a lot that you can understand about how all of this works. And 
you can work on these issues without being a computer science PhD. I 
completely agree that if you aren’t comfortable with these issues, a lot 
of the law is going to leave you behind. 
Continuing with technology issues, obviously a lot of attention last 
year after the San Bernardino attack, and the FBI’s attempts to get 
information from the perpetrator’s iPhone, and that brought this issue 
of the proliferation of strong encryption and its impact on law enforce­
ment and national security investigations to public attention. I’d like to 
ﬁrst get your explanation of this issue, for people who’ve heard about it 
but are not completely familiar, and then I’d like you to solve it. 
JB: OK, so, we’ve talked about the going dark problem, which many 
people have derided as a name, but that’s what we’ve called it. Going 
dark, it is essentially the inability of the FBI—or federal, state, local law 
904 [Vol. 48 
THE FBI AND INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE
 
enforcement as well as the intelligence community—to obtain, with 
appropriate legal process, the evidence or information that the law 
would otherwise entitle us to obtain because of some technological 
reason. That’s really what it’s all about—we can’t get the information 
because of the application of technology. Encryption is one subset of 
that, so I’ll just talk about encryption. I’ve said it before and I’ll keep 
saying it: the FBI supports strong encryption. It is a good thing for 
society; it protects our data across many different vectors, personally 
identiﬁable information, our commercial transactions, our ﬁnancial 
transactions, our health data, and it protects government information. 
Strong encryption is a good thing for society. 
But, strong encryption also has costs. It has costs in particular with 
respect to public safety because it impacts our investigations. It impacts 
our investigations by, in some instances, making evidence or foreign 
intelligence information simply unavailable. It’s just not there. We 
cannot, and will never, be able to get it. In addition, it has implications 
for our ability to conduct effective investigations. So it makes evidence 
unavailable, but it also slows us down because we have to try to deal with 
this problem; we have to try to ﬁgure out other ways to get at the 
evidence or to deal with the threat. It costs more money. It imposes 
risks, it increases risks, with respect to the investigation itself because we 
have to do riskier things. If we’re trying to keep it quiet and not let the 
perpetrator know we are investigating, they might ﬁgure it out because 
we’ve done something riskier. It creates risks to our investigators and 
undercover agents who might have to be in dangerous situations that 
they otherwise wouldn’t ﬁnd themselves in because we could get access 
to the person’s electronic communications. We might have to put 
human sources in there. We might have to use other techniques that 
are, perhaps, more fragile, if you will— 
MD: I’m going to want to come back to that. 
JB: OK, so we might have to use techniques like that. It creates 
signiﬁcant risks for the investigation. It is often argued that we should 
adopt or use substitutes for trying to obtain the content of communica­
tions, which is really what I’m talking about. Two that come up most 
often are legal hacking and metadata analysis. We do both but they are 
not a panacea; they do not solve all the problems. 
MP: So this is the FBI . . . ?  
JB: With a warrant, hacking into a particular device, as opposed to 
going to a provider, with an order, and saying “give me all of Mary 
DeRosas’ email.” If I can’t do that, if your communications are en­
crypted end-to-end and that’s not available to me anymore, one way to 
get around it might be to hack your device and try to see what’s 
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happening when it’s in the clear or when it’s not been encrypted. That 
is possible but those types of solutions are expensive. They are also 
fragile because anytime the manufacturer or the software developer 
changes something, it could throw the whole solution off. It’s not easy 
to do at scale if you have a whole network of people. Metadata analysis is 
great; we do it to understand communications networks and social 
networks if you will . . .  
MD: Can you give me just a sentence or two on what you mean by 
that? 
JB: An old-fashioned metadata analysis is understanding telephone 
records: who’s talking to whom, who else are they talking to, how does 
that work, and what do those connections mean? Then you start 
looking at who people are communicating with through a variety of 
communications platforms, and understanding how that network works. 
What ﬁnancial transactions a person engages in, what their movements 
are if we can understand those. In other words, understanding not the 
content of the communications, but data about the communications. 
That’s what metadata is. 
MD: There are a lot of people who would argue, I think, that there is 
a tremendous amount you can get out of metadata analysis, and maybe 
even so much that it makes the content analysis or the content, less 
important. What would your response to that be or your reaction to 
that be? 
JB: Metadata is highly useful, and we use it, there’s no doubt about 
that. But it is not everything. It can tell us who’s talking to whom, but it 
doesn’t tell us about what. So we might have some leads from some 
other source that says these are two “bad guys,” then we see that they 
talk a lot to each other, but we don’t know what they’re talking about. 
This came up in the threat in Garland, Texas that ended up with the 
perpetrator being shot by local law enforcement. We could see in that 
instance that the perpetrator was in contact with a terrorist operative 
overseas—I can’t remember the exact number—over a hundred times. 
But because of the platform that they were using, we couldn’t see what 
they are talking about. We knew they were talking, we didn’t know what 
they were talking about. 
For the law enforcement folks at the scene, something tragic might 
have taken place. So that is kind of what I am talking about. Metadata is 
good, it is useful, it’s not everything. It doesn’t tell you about the 
capabilities, plans, intentions, or activities of the threat actor in the 
same way. 
We, the FBI, are not trying to impose some solution on society. We 
don’t have the solution for this problem and we understand that. We’re 
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not trying to force American companies or the American people to 
adopt a back door or give us some golden key that undermines cyber 
security in some signiﬁcant way—we don’t want that. 
MD: There’s no pushing a particular legislative solution to build a 
backdoor or anything? Why? I assume it’s because you don’t think it 
would be useful—why is that? 
JB: So, the concern that we would have about a back door is that it 
would be threatening and would undermine even further our cyber 
security. Let’s just remember cyber security is not some “perfect” state 
we are in today and that the FBI is trying to get people to weaken that 
thing which is perfect. It’s not perfect now, so there are risks associated 
with it. But we don’t want to make it any worse, that’s for sure. We want 
to protect people’s privacy—we want to protect their personal informa­
tion. We want to protect their rights of association and free speech. We 
need to do that. We want American companies to be competitive and 
innovative, especially in the global marketplace in which they must 
operate. We want all of those things simultaneously. That is hard to 
do—and I don’t think anybody has ﬁgured that out. 
There are some interesting ideas that have been put forth. Matthew 
Tait on Lawfare had put out the “multiple envelope” concept, we can 
talk about it more if you want. There are certain things that are worth 
exploring in terms of getting an appropriate balance of all these things. 
But I think—as President Obama said—you can’t be absolutist about 
these things. We need to ﬁnd something that is an appropriate balance 
for American society. 
At the end of the day, look, what we’re saying is, we, the FBI, work for 
the American people. You have given us the responsibility to protect 
you from a range of threats and to enforce the criminal law. So the 
question is, what tools do you want us to have? What information do 
you want us to have available to us in order to do the job that you’ve 
given us? That’s the question. We’re trying to tell people that this is a 
problem and we don’t have a solution. But the country has to make 
some choices. And if it does nothing, that’s a choice because technol­
ogy will continue to evolve, and it changes every day. Encryption is 
spreading more and more, and in some ways that’s good, but it presents 
more and more challenges for us. 
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